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Abstract 
 
The European railway sector has undergone major transformations over the past two decades. 
Domestic reforms have been buttressed by European directives aimed at creating a single 
European railway market. In this new environment roles have been significantly redistributed, 
leading to new organizational models. A new and dynamic equilibrium is emerging, to which all 
railway stakeholders are trying to adapt. 
The paper looks at the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) from the innovation 
perspective. It argues that the concurrent liberalization of the sector and the technical 
harmonization (via the introduction of a pan-European signaling technology) have fragmented 
the railway sector on different levels (e.g. technological and organizational). The difficulties in 
developing and deploying a pan-European standard attest to the necessity of re-thinking 
innovation processes in the railway sector, particularly when those relate simultaneously to 
infrastructure management and operations. Among others, a broad consensus/alignment of the 
stakeholders on the type of performances aimed for (e.g. social, technical, operational, 
environmental or financial) need to be explicitly integrated in railway market organization 
models and by extension in railway innovation models.  
The article contributes to the analysis of innovation in large technical systems (LTS) by 
introducing a framework of performance objectives for the governance of innovation in LTS. 
 
 
 
Keywords: railways, innovation models, Europe, governance, performance. 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
For the past 20 years the European Union has been working towards reviving the railway sector 
and creating a “Single European Railway Market”. To do so, it has launched into an ambitious 
liberalization process. A number of important Directives (grouped in packages) have been 
introduced (e.g. regarding licensing, capacity allocation, access charges, etc.). 
In parallel to the liberalization process and in order to make the “Single Market” a reality, the 
railway sector has embarked on a European-wide project of harmonizing the networks from a 
technical perspective1. This is made possible in part through the introduction of a commonly-
agreed upon standard (or set of standards) for signalling known as European Railway Train 
Management System (ERTMS)2. Once fully deployed throughout the European railway network 
or at least through a number of corridors, it will allow trains to run across Europe without 
having to change drivers or locomotives3.  
Heralded as one of the major railway innovations in recent times, the tribulations of ERTMS in 
its development and deployment phases (De Tilière and Laperrouza, 2009) provide a good 
illustration of the necessity to integrate the technical dimension into the dominant economic 
approach to liberalization. As noted by Künneke & Finger (2009) notwithstanding unbundling, in 
a technical sense the railway system remains a network with a strong degree of 
complementarities and consequently fundamental coordination needs.  While achieving an 
integrated market rests on ensuring technical interoperability across the network (e.g. cross-
acceptance of rolling stock, unified signalling, etc.), the unbundling of the infrastructure 
management from the operations of trains risks to create new issues of interoperability 
between the newly created/separated entities. 
The paper argues that the paradigm shift taking place in the railway sector – of which we only 
start to see the contour – calls for a broad governance framework. It further argues that 
innovation processes need to be re-considered in light of the new environment by specifically 
taking into consideration coordination needs as well as performance criteria. The first section 
summarizes some of the major changes that took place in the European railway landscape in 
the last two decades. The second section identifies a number of challenges that have emerged 
from the liberalization process by illustrating them through the case study of ERTMS. The third 
section briefly reviews the major innovation models in the railway sector and how they apply to 
ERTMS. The next section introduces multi-dimensional performance objectives and argues that 
these criteria should be explicitly discussed and included in the innovation models and 
processes. The final section argues that coordination of the European railway sector remains a 
                                            
1 While limited to high-speed lines (HSL) and a number of freight corridors one can imagine that the harmonization 
effort will in due time be also extended to conventional lines. 
2 ERTMS is composed of ETCS (a standard for in-cab train control) and GSM-R (an extension of the GSM mobile 
communications standard for railway operations). 
3 The technical harmonization is accompanied by an operational harmonization (e.g. recognition of driver licenses 
across Europe) since it has been recognized that the latter can pose as much a barrier to the creation of a single 
market as technical harmonization. 
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central issue in the framework of the current integration process. It suggests that new 
mechanisms are required to deal with multiple performance objectives and the multi-level and 
decentralized environment in which railway innovations now take place.  
I.  Major changes in the European railway landscape 
For much of the 20th century European railways suffered from financial losses (usually covered 
via public subsidies), management inefficiency and an insufficient commercial outlook. During 
the past two decades, European Member States have progressively reformed their railway 
sectors with the goals of reducing state support, enhancing productivity and increasing the 
sovereignty of the market (Nash, 2008)4. In practice reforms concentrated on the introduction 
of competition into the rail transport market via separation of infrastructure from operations 
(at least in an accounting sense), on the progressive opening up of the market for new 
operators and on rules regarding the allocation of slots and the pricing of infrastructure use. To 
ensure non-discrimination between the incumbent companies and new entrants various 
regulatory models were introduced, many of them resting on the creation of independent 
regulatory agencies. 
The reforms were initiated by Directive 91/440 – granting access to railway undertakings5. A 
White Paper published by the Commission in 2001 (European Commission, 2001) outlined its 
ambition to revitalize the sector through the introduction of competition – freight was to be 
fully liberalized by 2007 and passenger service by 2012 – and through the reform of 
institutions6. The idea was to increase both the capacity and the safety of the sector. A first 
package of Directives was adopted in 2001 with the objective to achieve market opening of rail 
transport and create a single European railway market. It was designed around 3 axes: splitting 
the infrastructure from the activity of railway transport7, opening to competition the access to 
the network and achieving a regionalization of passengers regional railway transport. The 
European Commission then adopted in January 2002 a second package of measures to revitalize 
the railways by rapidly building an integrated European railway area. In March 2004 the 
Commission proposed a third railway package containing measures to move the European 
railways forward.  Adopted in October 2007, it introduced open access rights for international 
rail passenger services including cabotage by 2010. 
While the European Commission has taken the driving seat in reforming the sector, Member 
States still battle hard to retain control on their national networks. In many European countries 
                                            
4 Nash identifies four additional objectives: 1) improve rail’s market share in international traffic, 2) clearly 
differentiate the role of government, train operator and infrastructure manager, 3) put intermodal competition on 
a level playing field and 4) introduce direct “on-the-track” competition. 
5 Some countries preceded the Commission’s effort. In 1988 Sweden, the first European country to reform its 
railway market, demanded complete separation of infrastructure from operations and the empowerment of 
regional governments for planning and funding of regional services. The UK followed in 1993 with the passing of 
the Railways Act which led to the franchising of all passenger operations to private operators. 
6 The Commission should adopt a Communication on the Future on Transport in June 2009. 
7 Three different models for separation have emerged in Europe: 1) complete separation, 2) holding company and 
3) separation of key powers (Nash, 2008). 
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there are important delays in transposing EU Directives into domestic laws and even more 
delays in implementing the new legal frameworks – Member States differ in terms of how they 
have interpreted requirements set by the legislation. In fact, the majority of the countries only 
implemented the EU's minimum requirements8.  
Notwithstanding the delays in implementing EU Directives reforms have meant changes in the 
regulatory, market and organizational structures with far-reaching consequences for all the 
stakeholders. In some instances, the former vertically integrated state monopolies were 
unbundled and privatized (e.g. in the UK). In other instances, (e.g. in Germany) concentration 
has been on regional competitions. Some countries (e.g. Italy) have granted licences to new 
entrants to operate high-speed lines. Whereas privatization remains the exception, unbundling 
of the infrastructure manager from the operator is by-and-large on the way in most Member 
States9. France which has resisted reforms has now separated infrastructure from operations 
and allowed competition in the freight sector. On the ground, there are large variations in the 
extent to which railway markets are open to potential new entrants. Whereas the freight 
market is open to competition since January 2007 the passenger market remains to be open. 
While the different Member States are all taking divergent paths of liberalization, one can 
nonetheless note a number of significant changed that took place in the European railway 
landscape since the 90s (see Table 1).  
Table 1: European rail era 
 Previous era (till 1990) Transition era ( 1990-2005) Current era (after 2005) 
Organizational 
structure 
Vertically integrated Voluntary unbundling Mandatory unbundling10 
Regulatory policy 
and legislation 
National National with supra-national 
transport policy and directives 
National with EU Directives 
(railway packages) 
Drivers Public service Public service, productivity and 
financial sustainability 
Public service, productivity, 
financial sustainability, 
environmental concerns 
Market structure Monopoly Monopolistic (infrastructure) 
and market-oriented (services) 
Monopolistic (infrastructure) and 
market-oriented (services) 
Market opening Closed with limited 
international traffic 
Ad hoc opening of domestic 
markets 
Freight open 
Mandated opening of passenger 
market 
Ownership Public ownership11 Mostly state-owned State-owned (infrastructure) 
Some private rail companies 
Regulatory 
arrangements 
None (Ministry) None (Ministry) Independent railway authority 
Scale of network Regional and national National to international Increasingly international 
Source: Authors 
                                            
8 Countries are routinely sanctioned by the Commission for failing to transpose or implement new laws pertaining 
to railways. 
9 Sometimes only in an accounting sense (e.g. Switzerland or Germany). 
10 Under the mandatory unbundling, European countries have opted for different options, e.g. Total vertical 
integration Competitive access Vertical separation 
11 Governments generally became system owners during the first half of the twentieth century. 
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To create and support this new form of market organization, new regulatory regimes were set 
up (Coen, Héritier et al., 2002). During the first decade one could find a wide diversity in the 
type of regulatory bodies adopted by Member States. They could be classified in 3 broad groups 
(IBM, 2007): many European countries had a Ministry in charge or no regulatory body with 
decision-making powers. A handful of countries had adopted either a “railway authority” model 
(dealing primarily with licences, safety and other railway-specific administrative tasks) or a 
special regulatory authority (Austria, Germany, Italy, UK, Latvia and the Netherlands).  Only 3 
countries (Germany, Austria and the UK) had specially trained staff dealing exclusively with 
regulatory matters and with far-reaching powers to enable them to enforce their decisions. 
Some of the new Member States, in comparison with many old ones, had already set up better 
organized regulatory bodies. It is interesting to note that almost all countries that had made 
relatively good progress in terms of opening up their rail transport services markets had a 
special regulatory authority but most of the regulatory bodies had not yet been required to 
make decisions on discrimination cases. More recently there has been a shift towards setting up 
independent regulatory authorities. In France such an authority – Autorité de Régulation des 
Affaires Ferroviaires (ARAF) – has been created at the end of 2009. 
In spite of the important market and regulatory changes carried out the integration of the 
European railway market is far from achieved. Part of the reason is that the European Union has 
been pushing two major but contradictory objectives at the same time: the liberalization of the 
national markets and the creation of an interoperable network. In fact the regulatory 
governance structure necessary to achieve these two objectives differs. In the first case, it 
requires regulation for economic and financial performance. In the second case, it requires 
regulation for technical and operational performance. In fact, as we will see with the case study 
of ERTMS, they are potentially conflicting. Achieving technical interoperability comes at a huge 
[immediate] cost to railway operators and infrastructure managers without really bringing 
major returns in the short-term. In other words, like in other network industries, the 
sequencing of reforms matters. Achieving technical harmonization of the European railway 
network matters would have probably eased the re-organization of markets and the 
introduction of competition12.  
II. Challenges that have emerged from the liberalization process and their illustration 
with ERTMS 
While the initial aim to see railways play a central part in the European integration process has 
failed to materialize so far, a new wind seems to be blowing on the European railways (e.g., 
increase in traffic, favourable policies driven by environmental concerns, improvements in the 
opening of markets, etc.)13. But numerous challenges remain before railways can play a leading 
                                            
12 Within technical standardization it would have probably been more efficient to harmonize operational rules 
before technical rules. 
13 Some of the barriers to further integration lie in inadequate organizational structures to handle changes in task 
execution, inadequate mandates and lack of willingness of national regulators to implement and enforce 
administrative changes as well as lack of resources and willingness of rail undertakings and infrastructure 
managers to adjust to changed market structures. 
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role in EU integration, let alone before the creation of a single European railway market. 
Despite significant progress, a tension remains between Member States and the EU 
Commission when it comes to regulation and, more generally, governance of the railway sector. 
Recurrent delays of Member States in transposing and implementing European Directives 
pertaining to the rail sector attest to the reticence of countries to relinquish (regulatory) 
authority on their domestic operations14,15. It also shows the limits of the current institutional 
setting in which the EU drafts policies that remain at the “good will” of Member States. 
In practice the multi-level of governance (regional, national and supra-national) has created a 
patchwork of stakeholders whose interests are seldom aligned. Moreover a limited number of 
strong national railway companies (e.g. DB and SNCF) seem to play a disproportionate role 
when it comes to defining (or not) technical choices/trajectories.  
For the time the European railway sector remains fragmented on several levels: 
- Technical; problems of interoperability remain due to the technical complexity of the sector 
as well as the size of the network; in order to move the process forward interoperability is 
only mandated on high-speed lines and along a number of (freight) corridors16; 
- Financial; despite a notable improvement in the economic situation of many railway 
operators, their financial standing is far from excellent; infrastructure manager are even in a 
worse situation since the charging mechanisms  do not truly reflect costs – government 
subsidies make up for the losses;  
- Organizational; the vertically integrated monopolies have been unbundled and are under 
competitive and performance pressure; railways are increasingly decentralized and run 
according to market rules; ownership too is being transformed from one/few actors to 
several actors; at times public ownership is replaced by private or public-private 
arrangements.;  
- Administrative/legal; in virtue of the subsidiarity principle, national railway legislations are 
diverse both in terms of their design and implementation 
 
                                            
14 In the case of Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of 
charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification, six issues with considerable leeway for 
interpretation can be identified, leading to a potential for 240 different policy combinations that have to be 
addressed one by one. Empirical findings suggest that problems in transposition processes occur in almost 66% of 
all national implementing measures: 47% of national implementing measures have been notified late to the 
European Commission, of which 70% recorded delays of more than six months, with a maximum delay of 4.8 years. 
The time length of missed deadlines varies significantly between Member States and between transport sub-
sectors (Kaeding, 2008).  
15 This is not restricted to the railway sector. In the telecommunication sector, Member States are resisting the 
creation of a pan-European telecommunication regulator. 
16 Conventional rail and regional traffic will be addressed at a later stage. 
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In the electricity sector institutional fragmentation has led to several shifts with reliability 
consequences (De Bruijne, 2006)17. So far many countries have resorted mainly to a purely 
national approach to resolving these fragmentations. At the European level emphasis has been 
placed on the market to address these issues. 
 
The case of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) 
One central characteristic of any networked systems is the need for technical interdependence 
or compatibility. This means, among others, that increasing the competitiveness within the 
European railway sector cannot rely solely on an economic approach. For instance technical 
measures need to be taken to guarantee an interoperable railway system across Europe18.  
Establishing a European-wide technically interoperable railway system rests in part on a 
common signalling system. The sector has spent the last 20 years developing a pan-European 
control and command system (ERTMS) that will, in time, enable convoys to run from Sweden to 
Sicily without changing the train set. The system-wide innovation serves three purposes: 
improved interoperability of the trans-European rail network, the creation of a single market 
for procurement and the optimization of rail operations on a European-wide scale. While the 
ultimate goal of ERTMS is to ensure cross-border interoperability, its “side-benefits” are 
numerous: better and safer working conditions for train drivers, savings for railway 
undertakings in the long-term – different signalling systems for various networks are no longer 
required in the cab – and increasing the capacity utilization of the existing rail network – up to 
20% through higher speeds and reduced headways. As such, ERTMS plays a critical role in 
Europe’s railway market liberalization and integration agenda. 
The study of ERTMS development and deployment across two decades illustrates the far-
reaching changes brought by the European liberalization process. Three phases with a different 
emphasis characterize the project. Starting very much from an engineering perspective it 
shifted to politics – with the support of EU technocrats. The current phase sees the 
predominance of financiers (see table 2). 
The case of ERTMS offers a good example of the necessity to deal with multiple aspects in the 
governance of the European railway system address the fragmentation issues – or else to run 
the risk of failing to achieve competition and integration19. The funding mechanisms for ERTMS 
remain divided between national countries and the EU; in addition, unbundling has modified 
investment cycles as well as the distribution of the burden. From an organizational perspective 
unbundling has created a “catch 22” situation where infrastructure managers and railway 
undertakings have an incentive to invest in ERTMS only if the other has done so. But the 
                                            
17 Shifts from long-term planning to real-time management, from design to improvisation, from anticipation to 
resilience, from detailed analysis to operator experience and from risk-control to reliability-seeking behavior. 
18 Mulley and Nelson (1999) decompose interoperability into technical, corporate, judicial and cultural 
dimensions. 
19 As noted the creation of an integrated and competitive railway market rests to a large extent on achieving 
network interoperability. ERTMS plays a central part in achieving such interoperability. 
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deployment of ERTMS is taking place in a different legislative framework than from the past, 
one that requires better coordination20. At the same time there is a need for an overall system 
integration: one is looking at the railway system in different ways with 27 “closed” railways 
systems that need to be harmonized. As a result, one important issue to be tackled is 
identifying all the relevant stakeholders and their respective incentives21. Given the important 
changes in the railway sector, many of the actors involved do not know how to proceed in the 
new environment where so many strategic options are available.  
Despite substantial efforts in standardization, there are still important cross-country variations 
in the implementation of interoperability requirements22.  Pellegrin (2008) argues that the 
failure to achieve unified specifications and thus an interoperable European network is linked 
to the absence of an industrial project manager. Instead, each equipment manufacturer, in 
cooperation with its historical network, has developed a complete system of specifications. 
Furthermore, the European Commission, nominally in charge of the project has so far shown 
limited capability in managing the large number of European rail stakeholders. 
Table 2: Phases of ERTMS project 
 Studies and specifications 
1989-1997 
Final specifications 
1998-2004 
Roll-out 
2004-till 2020 
Technical level  Class P to Class 1 SRS 
SRS 2.2.2 and 2.3.0 
Work on 3.0.0 
Financial level National National National and EU subventions 
Organizational level Integrated railways Integrated railways Unbundled railways 
Legal level Directive 96/48/EC Directive 2001/16/EC 
Directive 2004/50/EC 
Transposition delays 
Administrative level No regulation (Ministry) No regulation (Ministry) 
Independent railway 
authority 
Stakeholders EEIG, ERRI, EUROSIG UNISIG, CENELEC, AEIF ERA and associations 
Emphasis Engineering Politics Financial 
Source: Adapted from UIC and Winter (2007) and personal interviews. 
 
III. Evolution of the railway innovation models 
The development of ERTMS actually coincided with a fundamental shift in railway innovation 
processes. In a nutshell, until the beginning of the 1990s, each country followed its own path: 
operators attempted to maintain their network inaccessible to foreign operators and favored 
their preferred national supplier/manufacturer for a sustainable co-operation. National 
industrial policies were always in the background, buttressed by very tight relations between 
operators, institutions and governments (Dobbin, 1994). 
                                            
20 For instance, there has been a separate handling of the two ERTMS components (i.e. GSM-R and ETCS) – for 
now, there is no integration responsibility between ETCS and GSM-R. 
21 It is important to keep in mind that many institutional players are not only linked to ERTMS. 
22 One should obviously differentiate the standardization of a technical component of the railway system (in this 
case signalling) from its regulation. The case study of ERTMS nonetheless shows that both are linked.  
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The needs of operators were driven by paradigms shared by institutions, manufacturers and 
governments at the national level. The resulting convergence in the decision-making process 
was intended to increase success rates in the development of systemic innovations. The strong 
involvement of national operators with the support of governments allowed the development 
of such innovations once a manufacturer was selected for a research program. Therefore more 
risk-taking and future-oriented strategies were possible for R&D, backed by a philosophy 
encouraging more long-term and co-operative strategies (De Tilière and Laperrouza, 2009). This 
innovation model increased the chances of reaching a critical mass of adoption in the national 
market. Subsequently the national supplier could compete for export sales using technical 
expertise and market knowledge acquired in the home market. But this model – driven by the 
paradigm of national industrial policies and “national champions” – brought so many obstacles 
and market barriers that in the early 1990s it was no longer compatible with the emerging 
European goals of creating a single European railway market (de Tilière, 2005). 
The Directive 91/440 introduced a fundamental change in the organization of the railway sector 
at the beginning of the 1990s. The reforms led to higher financial risks for R&D investments (for 
instance study contracts funded by operators were replaced by open tenders leading to 
increased uncertainty). Technical risks were higher in first contracts, as the operator had a 
lesser role in the validation process as done in the past with the “lead-users”. The operator was 
not involved anymore as early in the innovation process. At the same time there were no more 
extended tests projects for validation before commercial operation.  
The two innovation models described here, as well as the ERTMS innovation process, point out 
to the radical changes of the European railway framework. They also partially explain why more 
than a decade was necessary before the first commercial deployments. The changes resulted in 
a redefinition of the roles of each actor (operators, infrastructure owners, manufacturers and 
institutions). 
While ERTMS brings increased performances for safety, capacity and allows interoperability – 
great achievements from the technological side – big challenges have emerged in the 
management of innovation processes as well as the institutional and organizational changes: 
only a suitable institutional framework has enabled the ERTMS innovation to become a 
standard in Europe. The creation of ERA was a cornerstone in the European policy and the 
adaptation of its institutions. But even more than defining a new standard, the key role of ERA 
is to manage its long-term sustainability. For this, a strong and neutral arbitration of interests in 
the multi-stakeholder environment is necessary, each actor having its own interest in terms of 
functions, timing etc. 
If the institutional framework is sometime a prerequisite for the emergence of systemic 
innovations, additional leverage and means must be defined for the diffusion of standards. If 
things are clear when building new lines, the key issue for ERTMS remains the renewal of 
existing infrastructures to ensure interoperability. Railways don’t always find a business case 
matching the planning of the European Commission – a problem for the deployment of 
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European corridors. New ways shall be developed to find better means to proceed for a better 
overall performance of the European rail networks23.  
Table 3: Innovation eras 
National 
Pre-1990 
International 
1990-2010 
Global  
Post-2010 
Captive and operator-driven: 
operators attempted to maintain 
their network inaccessible to 
foreign operators and favored 
their preferred national supplier 
Competitive and supplier-
driven: operators not involved 
anymore as early in the 
innovation process and suppliers 
competing against each other 
Co-opetitive and stakeholder-
driven: operators involved again 
together with other 
stakeholders; policy-makers as 
“regulators” of performance 
objectives 
Source: Authors 
The last two decades have witnessed a shift of the definition of technical solutions on the 
manufacturer side, letting operators focusing on the definition of functional specifications. It 
also led to more challenges in the system integration in the case of systemic innovations, as 
well as a more opportunistic and risky types of markets. The new framework is aimed at 
avoiding expensive R&D programs (as done in the 1970s) with a higher selection rate of future 
standards, based on cost-effective solutions. However, it brings an increased complexity in the 
decision-making process24.  
Technological changes are happening faster than during the “national” era and are increasingly 
being dictated by user needs. Moreover the push for unbundling/functional separation may 
have not reached its final stage leaving the door open for other potential system-wide 
innovations.  
Such an environment calls for renewed coordination of systemic innovations – probably leaning 
more towards co-opetition than competition. However, since the stakeholders are much more 
fragmented, there is also a need for aligning the performance objectives on projects-level 
innovations as well as for those concerning the entire European railway network. 
ERTMS is the first important case of a systemic innovation in the new “liberalized” railway era. 
But one should not extrapolate too much from the ERTMS/signalling case. ERTMS represents a 
particular case in railway innovations as not all innovations in the sector exhibit such a systemic 
nature. Some technological niches will remain captive for still some time – something not too 
surprising since railway, like electricity are characterized by both strong path dependencies and 
high barriers for radical innovations (Markard and Truffer, 2006).  
Some challenges of innovations in railway networks 
                                            
23 For instance, national bodies will be required to better include full consideration of cross-border impacts in 
their decisions. 
24 This is mainly due to the vertical and horizontal disintegration of the actors’ organizations, in addition to the 
unbundling of operators and infrastructure owners. 
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A number of innovation challenges can be derived from the case study of ERTMS development 
and deployment (De Tilière and Laperrouza, 2009). First bringing new technologies in high 
performance and complex systems requires the mastering of product innovation risks and of 
system integration of subsystems. It also requires dealing with the conflicts between life-cycle 
of subsystems and components (5-10 years) and the overall system (25-30 years) and ensuring 
a business case for disruptive technologies (customer acceptance vs. proven technologies). 
Second, it requires to take into consideration the characteristics of rail market (e.g., big 
volumes to be done punctually for particular countries; limited number of customers and 
suppliers per country with high costs of certification & homologation). Third, it requires 
integrating the concept of networks and path dependency. Particular technological trajectories 
are often are to stray away from, something that is re-enforced by network size and effects. 
IV. Addressing the question of performance objectives 
One of the central characteristics of European railway sector’s liberalization lies in its market-
driven approach. As noted above, the governments’ recurrent failure to run “profitable” railway 
operations couple with mounting budgetary pressures led to the introduction of competition in 
several segments (e.g. freight and passenger transport). To ensure fairness (e.g. non-
discriminatory access), the unbundling of operations from infrastructure management was also 
mandated. This had led to a dominance of an “economic” approach to reforming the railway 
systems at the national level, focusing more often than exclusively on balancing the railway 
budget. Some countries (e.g. France) have vivid discussions on the question of public service 
and the necessity to maintain it – even when the lines are highly unprofitable. But few seem to 
be addressing the question of the overall performance of their railway network. 
A number of countries also already explicitly apply multi-dimensional performance objectives 
on a project-per-project basis. For instance the Swiss Ministry of Transport has developed a 
method to evaluate new railway projects based on criteria including generic objectives such as 
environmental, financial and social considerations (see table 3).  
Table 4: NIBA evaluation criteria 
Economic Social Environmental 
Maintain good ration between 
direct costs and utility 
Ensure basic servicing Reduce environmental pollution 
Optimize indirect economics 
costs 
Ensure acceptation, participation 
and coordination 
Reduce atmospheric pollution 
Reach self-financing Encourage social solidarity Manage resources 
Source: Office fédéral des transports (2009) 
 
The UK has probably the most sophisticated approach to rail performance. The Office of Rail 
Regulation (ORR) has devised multiple performance and market monitoring mechanisms. For 
instance the infrastructure manager undergoes regular and public performance reviews on 
criteria as diverse as customer satisfaction, operations (punctuality) or finance. 
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That said, the technical aspect of conceiving and running a railway network are generally left to 
engineers and often only remotely included in the system’s overall governance. At the same 
time, engineers are too often left out of the creation of new institutions (e.g. liberalization of 
the railway market). This is not to say that engineers do not participate in technical discussions 
at the EU level once the institutions are created. For instance, the European Railway Agency 
(ERA) has numerous “technical” working groups25. 
A substantial body of literature on performance management has developed since the late 
1970s. The first attempts at performance evaluation and review were associated with the failed 
attempts at large scale strategic planning in the 1970s (Boland and Fowler, 2000)26. 
Performance measures can be used for monitoring trends in performances or for comparative 
analysis of companies' performances on key performance indicators (KPIs). The measures can 
be used to evaluate the companies' performances and to learn about and improve corporate 
policies and optimize management processes. Through effective communication, performance 
measures can also be used as a marketing tool to enhance corporate reputation (Gelders, 
Galetzka et al., 2008). 
Cole and Cooper (2005) argue that performance indicators (PIs) are fraught with problems. For 
instance, taking the case of railways they criticize the narrow scope of performance indicators 
(strongly centered on punctuality and reliability whilst focusing only slightly on one aspect of 
safety27). They argue that the use of PIs reflects a wider political agenda (the maintenance and 
support of capitalism). For them, the use of railway PIs is an example of “how there is an 
increasing tendency on the part of government to quantify what cannot be quantified or ‘make 
the invisible visible’” (Cole and Cooper, 2005: 199). In the UK, the performance indicators used 
by government to render the railways accountable are narrow. In addition the question remains 
as to whether the information that these indicators transmit to the public gives a realistic 
impression of the quality of service provided to rail users. Di Francesco (1999) identifies various 
problems relating to performance measurement in the public sector (output specification, 
quality and effectiveness measurement, client identification) and suggests some possible ways 
of coping with them. Four main performance measurement criteria are identified: validity, 
reliability, functionality and legitimacy.  
Building on the NIBA evaluation criteria as well as on previous work on performance in technical 
systems (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 2005; Laperrouza and Finger, 2009), we contend that, akin 
to the project-per-project approach28, system-level innovation processes also need to explicitly 
take into consideration the various dimensions of performance – we propose a set of 5 
                                            
25 In fact representatives from the various constituencies (operators, infrastructure managers and equipment 
manufacturers) often have an engineering background. 
26 Boland and Fowler also point to the difference between public and private sector performance. The former has 
to account to several stakeholders while the latter has to respond solely, at least in theory, to its shareholders. 
27 For instance track maintenance or crime levels. 
28 We use the distinction between “projects” and “operational system” made by Geyer and Davies (2000). 
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performance objectives (see Figure 1 below) to inform the organization of railway markets and 
by extension railway innovation processes. 
In many cases, there is normally more than one objective, and these objectives are often 
formulated in such a way that they are difficult to measure – not to mention making it 
impossible to aggregate them into an overall index (Bruzelius, 2010). It is also important to note 
that the various performance objectives are to some extent incompatible and often require an 
arbitrage between them. 
Figure 1: Railway performance objectives 
 
For instance, ensuring an optimal public service (e.g. providing transport to the whole 
population at an accessible cost) will most likely diminish the financial profitability of the 
railway undertakings. Similarly, improving the environmental performance of railways (e.g., by 
reducing noise pollution) may force train operators to reduce speed in certain areas and 
therefore reduce operational performance. One could imagine installing noise-reduction walls 
along the tracks but this solution would have an economic impact. In this latest example, it is 
also particularly interesting that the noise pollution is created by the contact of the train’s 
wheel with the track. In a liberalized/unbundled environment, infrastructure management and 
train operations is more and more conducted by two different entities whose performance 
objectives may not be identical. 
The arbitrage between the various performance objectives of the different stakeholders 
requires an appropriate/complex institutional setting, i.e. a governance mode which takes into 
account the liberalization of the sector. To make things even harder, one of the central 
transformation taking place is the transition from national governance to supra-national 
governance (Coen and Thatcher, 2008; Rodrigo, Allio et al., 2009). As a result, any discussion on 
Financial 
Social 
Operational Technical 
Environmental 
Performance 
objectives 
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the performance of the railway system needs not only to be conducted between different 
domestic stakeholders but also at several levels (e.g. national and supra-national and even 
regional in some cases). 
 
V. Applying governance mechanisms to railway innovation processes 
Early on Puffert (1995) noted that 1) the new distributive functions in rail transport 
infrastructure planning and non-discriminatory track allocation control would require the 
creation of a new regulatory mechanism at the European level and that 2) the separation of 
infrastructure and operations would lead to important changes in the logic of international 
interest representation.  
As noted, the management of railway systems was relatively homogeneous across Europe until 
the 1990s. The economic characteristics of the railways sector (e.g., theory of natural 
monopoly) meant that a national monopolistic operator was under price and service regulation 
to protect the general interest. In practice, demand was often to be met at any cost and for an 
accessible price. Limited competition was held at bay since “the preservation of the national 
character of the industry was considered the key factor governing the overall regulation”.  
Over time governments have increasingly become consumers rather than builders of large-scale 
systems but nonetheless retain a number of prerogatives like setting policy objectives such as 
efficiency, coherence, flexibility or fairness (Abbate, 1999)29 . For historical reasons governance 
of the railway sector has so far been primarily addressed at the national level rather than at the 
European level. In fact, railway has notably lagged behind other network industries (e.g., 
electricity or telecommunication) . For instance the creation of domestic regulatory agencies 
has usually lagged behind other network industries since rail came rather late in the 
liberalization process (or had to face major opposition)30. When it comes to legislation at the 
EU level – the Commission disposed of only limited legal and institutional powers in order to 
overcome the resistance of the Member States31. This mostly comes from the fact that for most 
of its history, railways were conceived and managed almost exclusively at the national level. In 
addition, given the limited cross-border traffic, there was no real need to coordinate otherwise 
than through bilateral relations32. The study of ERTMS leads to a similar conclusion: while ERA 
is not a regulatory agency per se, it plays, together with the other railway stakeholders (industry 
associations and their members), a strong regulatory role but only to a certain point. It 
therefore finds itself in a weak position with a limited set of powers and strong oversight.  
                                            
29 Abbate identified a number of network characteristics which pose particular governance problems, including 
the interconnection of independent systems and geographic spread. 
30 Most formal governance structures and safeguards were exogenously drafted by political decision makers. 
31 The resistance to Brussel’s intervention into domestic railway policies is diminishing but still strong. 
32 Such a bilateral approach is still used in cross-acceptance of rolling stock, although there are signs that 
coordination is done at the corridor-level and even at the multinational level – in part because of the work from 
ERA. 
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At the same time, the governance of the European railway networks is made ever more 
complex by the addition of a supra-national authority (EC) which passes Directives that need to 
be transposed and implemented into national legislation. The real difficulty lies in the fact that 
Member-States are often reluctant to give up control of their domestic railway sector. As noted 
by Steenhuisen & van Eeten (2008) “realizing multiple public values in a large scale 
technological system (such as railways) requires a myriad of trade-offs because realizing one 
value can directly affect, postpone or thwart the realization of other values”. At the same time, 
it is important to recognize that the governance framework will need some flexibility in order to 
cater for the on-going transformation of the sector – for instance by adapting the governance 
framework to a given technology (and not the reverse). It is also important to keep in mind that 
incremental policies at the national level may be more effective than grand designs. 
Including innovation processes in the governance framework 
There is a vast literature on regulatory governance, including one that deals explicitly with 
network industries like railways (Coen and Windhoff-Héritier, 2005; Correa, 2006) or with multi-
level settings like Europe (Majone, 1996; Doern and Johnson, 2006; Rodrigo, Allio et al., 
2009)33.  Finger, Groenewegen et al. (2005) argue that for ensuring satisfactory functioning of 
any infrastructure requires coherence between the technical and institutional governance while 
Merkert (2007) notes that it may be efficient to have different governance structures for 
different rail tasks as well as for different types of train operation and infrastructure provision. 
Most existing governance frameworks address questions of ownership, organizational form, 
methods of regulator or market design but they tend to leave out consideration regarding the 
technical aspect of railways34.  
Mayntz (2009: 15) argues that “liberalization has created industries with highly complex 
structures and intricate interdependencies between actors, processes, and system properties. 
In light of such complexity, regulation would have posed a big challenge even if it were not also 
beset by multiple and partly conflicting, goals. In this situation it may well be that governmental 
R&D policy receives new importance. The development of LTS has always been affected by 
governmental R&D policy aiming to stimulate technological innovation – not to aid 
liberalization, but to improve international competitiveness [...]. Where state control over LTS 
has diminished, R&D policy, i.e. indirect guidance through financial incentives, may become 
more important.” 
It has been argue elsewhere that liberalization has massively increased coordination needs. LTS 
have been turned into complex systems of spatially distributed, interdependent parts fulfilling 
different functions, owned and directed by market actors who compete, but also cooperate 
                                            
33 The heterogeneous technical nature of the current European railway network makes the comparison with other 
network industries/large-scale systems very hard/irrelevant. The aviation sector has a history of more than 50 
years of international/global cooperation to standardize operations. In the telecommunication sector, which has a 
long history of standardization at the international level (e.g. via ITU), the hopes to create a pan-European 
regulator have been dashed.  
34 Bauer & Schneider (2008) make a distinction between the social and the technical subsystem and include 4 
layers of design issues: embeddedness, institutional environment, governance and resource allocation. 
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with each other, and who have entered into a multiplicity of contractual relations (Mayntz, 
2009: 18). Several authors have shown the impact of liberalization processes on innovation in 
LTS such as electricity or telecommunications (Godoe, 2000; Markard and Truffer, 2006). The 
growing complexity of the industrial structures has not seen a parallel evolution on the 
governance side (Peirone, 2007). Even at the government level, there has often been a failure 
to take into account the changing landscape. For instance, operations and financing of rail 
infrastructure are delinked – the former resting with the Ministry of Transport and the latter in 
the Ministry of Finance (Bruzelius, 2010).  
To make things even harder different policy arenas follow distinct time cycles. In a recent 
analysis on innovation in transport ITF (2010) finds that “there is insufficient co-ordination of 
transport policy on the one hand, and transport innovation and promotion policy on the other. 
The long-term orientation of innovation policy following the innovation cycle is difficult to bring 
in line with short- and medium term-oriented transport policy aims and measures. Moreover, 
there is an insufficient level of awareness about the importance of innovation among both 
public and private transport stakeholders. There is poor synergy between transport policy and 
industrial policy – numerous stakeholders and competing priorities from different sectors of the 
economy make convergence on innovation initiatives difficult”. A good place to start resolving 
those challenges could be the innovation scenarios of Kuhlman and Edler (2003), i.e. 1) 
concentration and integration of European innovation policies in transnational arenas, 2) 
decentralization and regionalization of innovation policy arenas and 3) centrally “mediated” 
mixture of competition and co-operation in integrated multi-level innovation policy arenas. 
Such a paradigm shift would require a dramatic departure from the Member States driven 
approach to organizing markets. 
VI. Conclusion 
The paper has argues that the Commission’s objective to have a single railway market requires a 
paradigm shift as to how the overall European sector is organized. While a number of 
harmonization measures have been (or are on the way to be) achieved at the EU level (e.g. 
signalling) Member States retain a large discretion on how their railway networks are operated, 
financed and developed. The sector is thus in a “transition” phase where some prerogatives 
have been moved to the supra-national level while others remain at the domestic level.  
 
The delay in deploying ERTMS as well as the problems linked to pursuing the development of 
the standard’s next version attest to the necessity of having a global approach to the 
governance of the railway sector as well as to some of the innovations which are systemic by 
nature. For sure, systemic innovations (such as ERTMS) are more the exception than the rule. 
However, by showing the need to align the incentives of the major stakeholders, it highlights 
the importance to go beyond the simple rhetoric of markets. 
 
The current European-wide governance deficit in the European railway sector is harmful for a 
number of reasons: it stymies innovation in the sector or at least greatly delays deployment of 
technologies. It also runs the risk of postponing the creation of a single European railway 
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market. The challenge will lie in finding a right balance between stimulating innovations in the 
sector (i.e. providing incentives for competing firms to invest) while avoiding to fall back in the 
era of captive innovation. Any governance framework put in place at the EU level will need to 
ensure that the European railway sector remains conducive to innovation and that the objective 
of a single European market for rail is achieved.  
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